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Russia’s Great Game Stratagem toward the Korean Peninsula Revisited: 
Lessons from the Failure of Imperial Russia*1
Se Hyun Ahn
This paper explores Imperial Russia’s Great Game Stratagem toward the Korean Peninsula and 
Russo-Japanese rivalry as well as Korea’s position in the balancing of power relations. Reconsidering 
the imperial Russian foreign policy toward Korea in the late 19th century and the early 20th century is 
essential to understanding the current policy of Russia toward the Korean peninsula and the dynamics 
of East Asian relations. Both the outcome and behavior of imperial Russian policy toward East Asia 
resembles in many ways those of the post Imperial Russian policy. This is because the perceptions that 
Russia and Korea developed about each other during that period still shape Russia’s foreign policy 
today. Perhaps, the best way to look at imperial Russia’s strategy toward the peninsula is to examine 
Russia’s behavior toward other great powers that were involved in the game of balancing power in 
Northeast Asia during that period. Finally, this paper delivers the crucial lesson for future Korean 
leadership and Korean diplomacy in the region.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s international geo-strategic posture over the Korean Peninsula resembles the 
early 20th century in many ways. The New Great Game is taking place over the Korean 
Peninsula.  The Korean Peninsula is experiencing another turmoil over North Korea’s nuclear 
proliferation issue, as if the old great Great Game had taken place over Komun Island in the 
region during the late 19th century. The surrounding nations including the six party member 
states are playing their own games and all the while they are not abiding by strict alliance 
rules. Balance of power relations has been the dominant force shaping Northeast Asia over 
past several centuries. And the Korean Peninsula has been always traditionally the battle 
ground and a scapegoat in the midst of balance of power relations. This fact has been also 
typically reflected by the inherent incompetence of Korean government since the late 19th 
century. 
Today’s South Korean government is also very shaky both in terms of domestic politics 
and foreign policy arena due to the ambiguity, incoherency, and the lack of confidence that 
the current South Korean government keeps manifesting. Even North Korea’s nuclear threat 
has amplified the complexities of Northeast Asian politics and the Korean Peninsula. It is 
safe to say that the current situation over the Korean Peninsula is even more unstable and 
dangerous than that of the early 20th century.  
Meanwhile, Russia’s power has not been traditionally influential over the Korean 
Peninsula. And yet Russia continues to take the role of spoiler at least from the South Korean 
perspective. In order to understand Russia’s position and philosophy toward the region, it 
is essential to trace back to the pre-Russo- Japanese war period. Russia’s current position in 
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the region is rather weak, compared to that of the late 19th and the early 20th century. And yet 
Russia’s stratagem has not substantially changed.  
In this sense, reconsidering the imperial Russian foreign policy toward Korea in the late 
19th century and the early 20th century is an essential task to understanding the current policy 
of Russia toward the Korean peninsula. Both the outcome and behavior of imperial Russian 
policy toward East Asia resembles in many ways those of the post Imperial Russian policy. 
This is because the perceptions that Russia and Korea developed about each other during that 
period still continues to shape Russia’s foreign policy today. Perhaps, the best way to look at 
imperial Russia’s strategy toward the peninsula is to examine Russia’s behavior toward other 
great powers that were involved in the game of balancing power in Northeast Asia during 
that period.
Korea has long been a battleground of rival ambitions due to its strategic importance. 
During the late 19th century, internal strife between the reformists and the extreme 
conservatives and inept administration led by incapable leadership made Korea’s location a 
liability for her people as foreign troops despoiled the land. Neighboring states such as China, 
Japan and Russia, along with Western powers including Great Britain, France, Germany and 
the United States desired to take advantage of the weakness of Korea as much as possible and 
to be the most influential power in this Great Game.
Throughout the struggle among the great powers over weak Korea, Russia and Japan 
were the most competitive contenders in this Game. However, Japan’s victory over Russia in 
1905 provided it with a great opportunity to be the most dominant player in this gambit than 
any other great power. Accordingly, Russia eventually lost total control of Korea. Russian 
policy failed in Korea not only because it lost to Japan, but also because Russian pretensions 
in Korea up to 1905 came to nothing. Russian pretensions in Korea suffered from vacillation 
of policies, unpredictable personalities, insincerity in its diplomatic conduct, lack of military 
clout in the Far East, and the distrust of the Korean people.  
This paper is comprised of largely six parts. The first outlines the general features of the 
Great Game in Korea. Accordingly, the following issues will be addressed: 1) the origin and 
the background of the Game, 2) the players in this Game, and 3) the reasons why the Game 
took place in Korea? The Komun Island (Port Hamilton) incident is the subject of the second 
part of this paper. The third part will discuss the two major events in this Great Game: the 
Tong-hak (eastern learning) peasant rebellion and the Sino-Japanese War. In this part, the role 
of Russia in the Sino-Japanese War and the impact of the War on Russian policy in Korea 
will be particularly highlighted. The fourth part will examine how Russian influence in Korea 
at first increased and then declined after 1895 and how Russo-Japanese rivalry developed 
in this Game up to 1904. The fifth segment concerning the Russo-Japanese War, sets out 
with the following questions: 1) its cause, 2) reasons why Japan won, 3) its nature, and 4) 
its implication for Korea. Finally, Russian interests in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War 
will be assessed. The conclusion of the paper will attempt to evaluate Russian performance 
in this Great Game, and to explain why Russia eventually turned out to be an unsuccessful 
contender. 
RUSSIA’S GREAT GAME STRATAGEM TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA REVISITED 57
2. THE GREAT GAME IN KOREA
2.1. Background
Although the Great Game in Korea turned out to be a major battle between Russia and 
Japan in the end, the deepest roots of the Great Game in Korea lay not so much in the East 
Asia but in Europe, as was in the case of Crimean War. The opening of Korea to diplomatic 
and commercial relations led to its involvement in the conflicts between Western powers 
which had interests in East Asia. Among them, one of the most important of these was that 
between Great Britain and Russia. British power in Asia was primarily focused on India, but 
the vital British trade with China brought frequent and not always friendly contacts with the 
expanding Russian Empire. There had been chronic hostility between the two nations ever 
since the Crimean War of 1856, and Britain viewed the expanding power of the Russian 
Empire in Asia not only as a threat to its own interests but also as a threat to the balance of 
power in Europe at the time. When the Russians reached the Pacific and installed the port 
in Vladivostok within easy reach of Korea’s northeastern frontier in 1860, Korea inevitably 
became a focal point in this rivalry.1 It was Great Britain that stirred China to action, to 
tighten her control as the age-old suzerain when there was a report that Korea might become 
a Russian protectorate in 1885.2 This renewed interference by China in Korea excited Japan, 
and finally led, a decade later in 1895, to war between the two contenders.
As time went by, the Great Britain lost its strategic and economic interests in Korea. 
After the treaty of Shimonoseki which settled the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the apparent 
contenders in the Far East turned out to be Russia and Japan.3 However, when efforts to settle 
the issue of spheres of influence in both China and the Middle East with Russia failed, Great 
Britain signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, breaking the English diplomatic tradition of 
splendid isolation of the nineteenth century and positively sided with Japan.
In 1894 Korea became the target of concession seekers. By the end of 1895 China had 
absolute control over the telegraph franchise; Japan had obtained vast fishing rights as well 
as a monopoly over production of paper, the mint, glassworks, and other enterprises; citizens 
of the United States held concessions in coastal trade, pearl fisheries, electric power in Seoul, 
timber grants, and a gold-mining concession in the entire Unsan district of the province of 
Pyongan, which for forty years proved to be the most profitable and the largest out of all the 
concessionary enterprises in Korea.4
Although a number of countries were involved in the Great Game in Korea, the major 
contenders were China, Japan and Russia. The first phase of this Great Game ended with 
the victory of Japan over China in 1895 and the proclamation of Korean independence. The 
second phase also ended with the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 and the eventual 
Japanese annexation of Korea.5 In particular, each of the two players during the second phase 
1 Han, Woo Keun, The History of Korea (Seoul: The Eul-yoo Publishing Company, 1987), p. 396.
2 Malozemoff, Andrew, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), 
pp. 27-36.
3 Nish, Ian H., The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London and New york: Longman, 1996), pp. 
22-28.
4 Harrington, Fred Harvey. God, Mammon, and the Japanese. (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1944.), pp. 144, 146, 156,158.
5 Lensen, George Alexander, Korea and Manchuria Between Russia and Japan 1895- 1904 (Tallahassee, 
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of the game had an ally as well as a sympathizer. Russia had France as an ally and Germany 
as a sympathizer, while Japan had the Great Britain as an ally and the United States as a 
sympathizer.
3. GEO-POLITICAL VALUE OF KOREA
International rivalry over Korea in the late 19th century and the early 20th century was 
due in part to its strategic importance. Strategic value is closely related to national security 
conceptions because it provides visions and beliefs about how security is best attained. 
Depending on the definition of national security, strategic value can range from political 
issues to economic, resource-related, environmental, and demographic issues. Some locations 
and some countries are strategically important because of their intrinsic value. When such 
areas become vital to another nation’s survival or interests, that nation maneuvers to gain 
control over those area. The Korean peninsula was an example of such an area. It is a bridge 
between the continent and Japan; it borders onto China and Russia by land and onto Japan by 
sea; it possesses ice-free ports and as a result, was in a position to facilitate or hinder Russian 
access to the Pacific. From the Russian strategic perspective, Korea represented a buffer zone 
against which an ocean power could prevent Korea from becoming a stepping stone for the 
approaching invader.
To a large extent, international rivalry in Korea, as mentioned previously, was encouraged 
by the weakness, corruption, and division of the Korean government. Korean disunity 
provided an opportunity for foreign interference and the various Powers deemed it necessary 
to prevent each other’s control of the region. Koreans did seek to strengthen their own hands 
by playing the foreigners against each other. Nevertheless, Korea was too weak to do so with 
much success at that time. And Japanese interference in the internal affairs of Korea during 
the transition decade climaxed in 1895 with the assassination of the Queen. The height 
of Russian influence was reached the following year as a direct result of this outrageous 
incident, when the Korean King sought refuge from the Japanese by seeking protection 
inside the Russian legation. Russian attempts to establish a settlement at the Korean port of 
Masampo aroused international concern.6
4. KOMUN ISLANG (PORT HAMILTON) INCIDENT
4.1 The beginning of the Great Game
Komun Island incident in 1885 was the beginning of the Great Game in Korea. As Anglo-
Russian rivalry had spread from the Near East and Central Asia to the Far East and as the 
possibility of war between Russia and Great Britain increased, the British had decided to 
acquire another Pacific naval base for fear that Chinese neutrality might deprive them of the 
use of Chinese ports in the event of hostilities.7 They had chosen Komun Island because they 
Florida: The Diplomatic Press, 1966), p. 2.
6 Lensen, Korea and Manchuria... pp. 2-3.
7 Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naiapolitikakapitalistcheskikhderzhavna Dal’nemVostoke, 1860-1895. 
Moscow, pp. 376-377., citing Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, p. 54.
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thought of it as the key to the Korean Strait.8  Komun Island was a spacious yet well-sheltered 
harbor formed by three islands off the southern tip of Korea. It is often called Port Hamilton, 
since it was named after the secretary of the British Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton, by an 
English surveyor in 1845.9
In April 1885, the British occupied Komun Island, notifying the Korean government 
after the fact, arguing that their government had found it necessary, in view of certain 
eventualities, to authorize the temporary occupation of the port.10 They justified their action 
to the world as a move to prevent probable occupation” of the island by another power. The 
British Admiralty reasoned: To Russia it would afford an important depot and naval port, 
free from ice at all seasons, and in this respect far superior to Vladivostok,” even though 
rumors of a secret Russo-Korean agreement and warnings of possible Russian seizure of Port 
Hamilton had not reached London until after the decision had been made by the cabinet.11
The British occupation of Komun Island was directly motivated by Russia’s breach of 
its agreement with the Great Britain over the Afghanistan question. On March 30, 1885, 
local Russian authorities broke their pledge to refrain from further advances on the Afghan 
frontier until the joint Anglo-Russian commission could finish the delimitation of the new 
northern border of Afghanistan, precipitating an acute crisis in Anglo-Russian relations.12 
Roused to a fever pitch, Great Britain prepared for war.13 Among other measures, it chose 
to follow a traditional strategic plan – to attack Russia at some weak point in Russia’s far-
flung possessions.14  The Royal Navy was placed on full alert, with instructions to monitor 
the movements of all Russian warships. In the Far East the fleet was ordered to occupy Port 
Hamilton in Korea so that it might be used as a base for operations against the great Russian 
naval stronghold at Vladivostok and other targets in the North Pacific.15 The occupation of 
these islands would advance the British fleet 1,200 miles farther from their nearest base at 
Hong Kong and would bring it within easy operating distance of Vladivostok, which was 
only 850 miles from the port.16
The Russians immediately protested, and threatened that, if this move had been made 
8 Vice Admiral Sir William Dowell to secretary of the Admiralty, Audacious at Nagasaki, May 28, 
1885, A Confidential, EA, FO 405-36, p. 4; Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet on the Importance 
of Port Hamilton (Korea), Feb. 5, 1885, EA, FO 405-35, p.1., in Park, Il-Keun, Anglo-American 
Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea 1866-1886, (Seoul, Korea: Shin Mun Dang Publishing 
Company, 1982)., p. 488.
9 Confidential. Correspondence respecting the Temporary Occupation of Port Hamilton by Her 
Majesty’s Government. A Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet on the Importance of Port Hamilton 
(Korea), E. H., in Park, p. 488.
10 Earl Granville to Mr. O’Conor., No. 84. Confidential. Ext. 15.  Foreign Office, April 23, 1885., in 
Park’s Anglo American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea., p. 492.
11 Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, p. 54.
12 Allen G., James, “Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1865-1885" (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1936), particulary chaps. 10 and 11., citing Malozemoff, p. 29.
13 Ibid., p. 29., and William Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1837-1907 
(Urbana, University of Illinois, 1937), pp. 54-55.
14 Malozemoff, p. 29.
15 Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game, p. 429.
16 Malozemoff, p. 29.
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with Chinese approval, they would occupy another part of Korea, Quelpart (Cheju) Island, 
as compensation.17 The Korean government also protested through China. Negotiations 
there upon began between Britain and Russia with Chinese mediation, and Britain agreed 
to withdraw.  Withdrawal was very slow, however, and the last British forces did not leave 
Komun Island until 1887, after Russia had given assurances that it would not occupy any 
Korean territory and China had promised not to approve the occupation of any part of Korea 
by any nation.18
4.2 Implications for Russia
In this first encounter, Korea’s independence was saved by intense Russo-British rivalry, 
but Russia’s interest had once and for all been aroused. In 1888, in a secret memorandum, 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined its conception of the Korean situation: since 
the country was under Chinese influence, it was essential for Russia to oppose China in 
Korea and to work toward Korea’s independence from Peking. In this respect Russian policy 
coincided with that of Japan. Great Britain was opposed, as was China, to Russian advances 
in the Far East, and was considered another opponent. The line-up of powers in Korea 
appeared to be: Russia and Japan against Britain and China.19
In addition, the Komun Island incident reversed the naval policy of Russia in the Far 
East and thus led indirectly to the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Moreover, it 
demonstrated how easily the Russian Far Eastern fleet could be blocked in the Sea of Japan. 
In time of war, Russian warships would not be able to use natural ports; the Russian fleet 
would therefore be forced into a defensive role for lack of coaling stations.  In addition, the 
fleet would be useless against Great Britain, since it was not strong enough to defeat the 
China fleet of the British; yet the fortifications of Vladivostok and its garrison secured it 
against any coup de main that might be attempted by the British fleet. In 1887 Russia adopted 
a new defensive policy for her Far Eastern possessions.  This depended on land forces 
rather than naval strength. The Far Eastern fleet was reduced to a minimum.20 Vladivostok 
declined in importance as a naval base, and by 1888 it was reported to be almost deserted in 
comparison with its original state during the brief period of Russian naval supremacy in the 
Far East in 1879-1880.21
As part of the new policy, the vessels of the Volunteer Fleet were placed under the 
control of the Ministry of Naval Affairs and were once more equipped to act as destroyers 
of commerce in time of war.22 The Russian government then took direct control of the 
maintenance of its communications from European Russia to the Far East.  Only when the 
17 Cheju Island is situated between Cheju Strait and the East China Sea.  It is one of the most famous 
resort area in Asia., NovoeVremia, August. 20, 1885, as translated in EA, FO 405-35, p. 112., citing 
Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, p. 58., and Han, p. 397.
18 Han, p. 397.
19 Dallin, David J., The Rise of Russia in Asia (New Haven: yale University Press, 1949), p. 30.
20 Matiunin, N. G. NashisosedinakrainemVostoke,VestnikEvropy, XXII, No. 7 (July, 1887), p. 82., 
citing Malozemoff, pp. 33-34.
21 P. Chikhachev, KaliforniaiUssuriiskiikrai,VestnikEvropy XXV, No. 6 (June, 1890), p. 562., citing 
Malozemoff, p. 34.
22 Zepelin, op. cit., I, 211; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, General Information Series, VI, Recent 
Naval Intelligence, June, 1887 (Washington, 1887), pp. 287-288., citing Ibid., p. 34.
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Trans-Siberian Railway was in operation across the continent of Asia was the Volunteer Fleet 
returned to its civil status.23
5. THE yEAR OF 1894: THE TONG-HAK REBELLION AND  
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR
5.1 The Tong-hak Peasant Rebellion
In June, 1894, the second Tong-hak Rebellion in Korea plunged the Far East into a new 
era of intensive international rivalry.24 The Tong-hak (Eastern Learning) society’s main aim 
was to drive all foreign influence from Korea and reform the government of Korea by the 
Koreans.25 The first rebellion of 1893 aroused only slight international interest because the 
Tong-haks were crushed by the Korean government before American, Japanese, Chinese, 
British, and German warships could land at Chemulpo (the port for the capital, Seoul).26 
However, in March, 1894, equipped with arms from Japan and backed by Japanese ronin 
(hired gangsters and soldiers of fortune),27 the Tong-haks quickly spread through the southern 
Korean provinces. In May they defeated government forces sent against them, and in June 
they once again threatened the capital.28 British, French, Japanese, and Chinese warships 
23 Ibid., op.cit., I, 212.
24 Malozemoff, p. 52.
25 The despair and misery of the Korean people in the nineteenth century found expression in the Tong-
hak Society. Some of the members of this society were robbers, but many were men who had been 
driven to desperation by oppression and who had determined to put up a fight for better conditions at 
any cost to themselves. The movement began as a religious reformation. Its founder, Choi CheiOu, 
who had seen something of the Roman Catholic missionaries and had vaguely discerned some of 
their teachings, alleged that he had a vision in 1859 at his home in Kyong-ju, in southern Korea. 
He forthwith proclaimed a new faith which included cherry-picked elements of Confucianism, 
Buddhism, Taoism, and Romanism, and which he called Tong-hak, or Eastern learning. Followers 
multiplied. Loyal at first to the dynasty, the hostility of the government and the sorrows of the 
people developed the Tong-haks into revolutionaries.  Convinced that foreign influences were 
undermining the ancient institutions of the country and arousing the anger of the gods, the Tong-
haks were avowedly anti-foreign. They strenuously urged the preservation of the old ways, and 
presented appeals to the throne calling for the extermination of foreign invaders, the cutting of all 
relations with other nations, and the prohibition of alien religions. The movement quickly became a 
menacing one and it climaxed in 1894 and helped to precipitate the Sino-Japanese War. From time 
to time, the Tong-haks issued inflammatory proclamations, which usually stated in plain languages 
the grievances of the people, arraigned the magistrates as cruel and corrupt, and called for reforms in 
every department of the government.  Oda, Shogo.,ChosensiTaikei (Seoul: Korean Historical Society, 
1929), pp.118-121.
26 Akagi, R. H. Japan’s Foreign Relations, 1542-1935.  (Tokyo: Hokseido Press, 1936). op. cit., p. 137.
27 A. Heard, China and Japan in Korea, North American Review, XIX (1894), pp. 300-308.  By 1894, 
the Japanese were becoming exasperated by the strong Chinese political influence prevailing in 
Korean government, and were willing to make use of the Tong-haks.  The Tong-haks in turn were 
glad to receive assistance from Japan in arms and soldiers for their attempt which failed in the 
previous year.
28 Telegram, Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1894, K.A., L-LI, 7-8.
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again assembled at Chemulpo, and even Russia belatedly sent a gunboat.29
On June 2 the King of Korea made a formal request for Chinese intervention, and on 
June 7 the Tsungli Yamen notified Komura, the Japanese Charge d’ Affaires at Peking, that 
China would send troops to Korea to restore the peace of our tributary state.30 Japan in 
return notified China that the latter had never recognized Korea as a tributary state of the 
Chinese empire.31 In accordance with the Tientsin Convention of 1885, both China and 
Japan proceeded to send troops to Korea. Before many units arrived, the Korean government 
had managed to subjugate the rebels; nevertheless, both countries continued to send more 
troops.32
The Korean government now asked both Japan and China to withdraw their troops 
from Korea. Japan, however, had set forth a new program on June 22, which indicated that 
Japanese troops would not withdraw until Korea reformed her administration.33 According 
to the official Chinese statement made to Count A. P. Cassini, the Russian Charge d’Affaires 
at Peking, the Japanese made several offers which would have given both China and Japan 
control of the Korean government, but China refused them, faithfully adhering to the Russo-
Chinese understanding of October, 1886 (Li-Lodyzhensky Agreement).34 
5.2 The Sino- Japanese War: outbreak and the implication for Korea
War broke out on July 25, 1894 with an unprovoked attack upon Chinese ships in the 
Yellow Sea near Asan Bay, which were sunk or driven off. Simultaneously, Japanese troops 
marched south from Seoul to attack Chinese units in Asan and Kyongju, who they defeated 
on July 29. The remnant of the Chinese force retreated north by a circuitous route to 
Pyongyang, where they joined other forces sent from China. The Sino-Japanese war began 
with a swift series of victories for Japan.35
China had a population of over 300 million as compared with Japan’s 40 million, but 
Japan was far superior to China in armed forces and it took her only eight months to inflict 
a decisive defeat on the Chinese. Japan transmitted to China peace terms which included: 
independence for Korea; annexation by Japan of the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores; 
payment of a war indemnity of 200 million taels by China; and, finally, cession of the tip of 
Liaotung Peninsula, in Manchuria, with Port Arthur, to Japan.  China had no choice but to 
accept these terms. Japan emerged as the first non-European Great Power in modern history.36
With the Chinese gone and her own forces helpless, Korea was now forced to sign a 
series of agreements that placed her virtually under Japanese rule. The Japanese obtained 
rights to build railroads and telegraph systems. All ports on the Cholla coast were opened 
to Japan. A treaty of military alliance was signed which in effect made Korea a source of 
Japanese military supplies. All Chinese residents were to be deported.  Korea was completely 
29 Malozemoff, p. 52.
30 Akagi, op. cit., p. 137.
31 Ibid., pp. 342-343.
32 Ibid., pp. 137-138.
33 bid., p. 139.
34 Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 53.
35 Han, p. 411.
36 Dallin, p. 38.
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in Japanese hands.37
5.3 Russia’s performance
It is interesting to note that it was the Russian menace that prompted Japan to go war 
with China over Korea in 1894. By that time the Trans-Siberian was under construction, 
and within a few years a direct railroad, capable of carrying not only goods but regiments 
of troops and heavy artillery, would connect St. Petersburg and Moscow with Vladivostok. 
In order to secure at least a buffer between herself and Russia and, if possible, bring Korea 
under her control, Japan was prepared to wage war on China. Witte stated that, the war 
which Japan conducted in 1894-1895 is the consequence of the construction of the Siberian 
Railway.38 The British envoy in Japan also summed up the causes of the conflict in a 
confidential report to London: Whatever the ostensible reason for that the main object was 
to anticipate the completion of the Siberian Railway and to prevent Russia from gaining free 
access to the Pacific Ocean.39
Immediately following the Japanese victory, the acquisition by Japan of a strategic area 
in Manchuria threatened Russia. In February 1895, the Russian government decided to 
negotiate with the powers in order to force Japan to relinquish Liaotung. France, as Russia’s 
ally, promptly agreed to go along; Germany, which had a hidden scheme of its own, also gave 
her consent; England, however, refused.40 On April 20, the Triplice, consisting of Russia, 
Germany, and France, presented Japan with a note demanding the restoration of Liaotung to 
China. The Russian note informed Japan:
The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, in examining the 
conditions of the peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the 
Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, 
would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be 
a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East.
Consequently the Government of His Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of 
their sincere friendship for the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising 
him to renounce the definite possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung.41  Japan did not reply 
immediately. However, the Japanese General Staff realized that Japan could not fight the 
combined forces of the Triplice, and yielded to the demand on May 8, 1995.42 Accordingly, 
Russo-Japanese relations began to deteriorate, and Russia emerged as the savior and protector 
of China.
5.4 The implication for Russia
The success of the Triplice was a triumph of Russian policy. Russia won all her short-
term aims. After the Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the retro cession of 
37 37 Han, p. 411.
38 Romanov, B., Rossiya v Manchzhurii (Leningrad, 1928), p. 63., citing Dallin, p. 36.
39 British Documents on the Origin of the War, Vol. I. London. Report dated March 26, 1898.
40 Dallin, p. 38.
41 Tschirsky to German Foreign Office, April 20, 1895, G.P., IX, 271; Gerard, op. cit., pp. 43-44; Akagi, 
op. cit., pp. 162-163., citing Malozemoff, p. 66., and Dallin, p. 39.
42 Akagi, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
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Lading, Russia adopted an active policy in the Far East for the first time since 1860. Before 
1895, Russia had been content with the status quo because no power had entered her security 
zone- Korea, Manchuria and neighboring areas.43 Whenever Russia attempted to obtain an 
ice-free port, it was more of a counter-move to activities of other nations and was aimed at 
more forcing those powers to retract their claims than obtaining a port for herself.44 However, 
after 1895 Russia began to take strong measures in the Far East. First, the problem of whether 
to rely on China or Japan was settled by the enmity aroused in Japan because of the actions 
of the Triplice. Secondly, the importance of obtaining an ice-free port was now more clearly 
envisaged with the increase of Russian naval power in the Far East. Finally, as discussed 
before, the need for a railroad to the Far East became closely associated with the defense of 
the Amur river frontier.45
For Russia, the main effect of the Sino-Japanese war was the chance to take advantage 
of China’s resulting weakness. The areas of China bordering on Russia now appeared to 
constitute a power vacuum which Russian men and material had to fill- just as they had been 
for several decades filling the spaces of Central Asia. This Russian drive into Manchuria, 
Mongolia, and Korea was certain to arouse British enmity, but Britain was far away and the 
risk was well worth taking so long as China could be counted upon to offer no resistance 
and so long as Japan seemed too weak to interfere.  Russia was still inclined to minimize the 
extent of the Japanese victories. The traditional view that little Japan was a negligible power 
compared with giant Russia continued to prevail there.46
6. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN KOREA AND  
RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVARLy FOLLOWING 1895
6.1 Preeminence 
Following the defeat in 1895 China was compelled to relinquish all claims to Korea, 
and Japan remained in actual control of Korea. Modernization and reforms were proclaimed 
at Japan’s behest; opposition to Japanese influence was suppressed. The Queen of Korea, 
opposed to Japanese rule and reform, was assassinated, and the King, fearing for his life, 
took refuge in the Russian legation in Seoul.47
Events began to take a course which had not been anticipated in Tokyo. Russia sought to 
push the Japanese out of Korea and establish her own protectorate there.  Tokyo had hoped 
to obtain control of Korea by defeating China before Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway was 
completed. By its victory, however, Japan had provoked Russian penetration of Korea, where 
until 1894 it had faced a weak China. Now China was out of the game, but Russia replaced 
her as a new and even stronger rival of Japan in Korea.
From the beginning of their rivalry, Russia and Japan showed discord. For the first time 
in history, the 38th parallel was suggested - by the Japanese - as a borderline dividing Korea 
43 Pyong Do yi.  Kook SaDae Kwan (Seoul: Pyo Moon Kak, 1955), pp. 549-50.
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into two foreign protectorates. Lobanov-Rostovsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
rejected the plan. Then the Japanese proposed a joint proclamation of the independence 
of Korea. Lobanov- Rostovsky turned down this offer, too. The agreement concluded was 
rather narrow in scope; it was supplemented a few months later by a new protocol between 
Lobanov and the Japanese envoy, yamagata.  Both powers were thereby entitled to keep a 
limited number of troops in Korea (800 Russians and 1,000 Japanese). Russia did not live up 
to the agreement, however, and the following year a considerable number of Russian officers 
were dispatched to reconstruct and train the Korean Army.48
At the beginning of 1896, Russia began to influence Korea significantly. The Japanese 
assassination of the Queen of Korea was turning point for Russia to become a major 
contender in Korean affairs. At three o’clock on the morning of October 8, 1895, Japanese 
soldiers and criminals ransacked the Queen’s palace. When they found her, they immediately 
stabbed her. She was carried, dying, into the courtyard and there, even before she was fully 
dead, her assassins poured kerosene over her body and set it aflame, to hide the evidence 
of how she had been killed.49 After this incidence, anti-Japanese movement was prevalent 
throughout the country. The Korean King himself had to seek for foreign aid to check Japan’s 
influence in Korea. And he took refuge to the Russian legation. After the King had moved 
to the Russian legation, the pro-Japanese ministers in the Korean government who could 
not flee in time were massacred with brutality by anger-driven masses50 and the Japanese 
political influence in Korea decreased.  
The new Russian envoy, Alexis Speyer, who arrived in Seoul in January, 1896, soon came 
to exert influence in Korean affairs. The Korean King, who remained at the Russian legation 
from February, 1896, to February, 1897, was made a tool of Speyer’s policy. King Kojong 
signed laws abolishing all the reforms proclaimed at the request of the Japanese. The War 
Department in St. Petersburg detailed a plan for a Korean Army of 250,000 under officers 
of the Imperial Russian Army. At the coronation of the new Tsar, in May, 1896, Nicholas 
II received a humble request from King Kojong - who was still in Russian custody - that 
Korea be placed under Russian protection. The Tsar granted the request and only through the 
intervention of his Minister for Foreign Affairs was this weighty and potentially dangerous 
decision revoked.51
In February, 1897, King Kojong returned to his palace, but the informal Russian 
protectorate remained in effect and Russian influence continued to increase. More than 60 
Russian instructors worked with the Korean armed forces. Industrial concessions, including 
important lumber concessions at the Tumen River and in the yalu Valley, were granted 
to Russian companies. A mining concession in Hamgyong Province was also granted. 
Moreover, Russia and Korea agreed to the construction of telegraph lines connecting them. A 
Russian - language school had already been founded in Seoul the previous April with the help 
of a Russian officer.52 Upon the advice of the Russian envoy, King Kojong assumed the title 
of Emperor in order to underscore his complete sovereignty: As if in anticipation of political 
theories of the 1940's, to the Russian envoy national sovereignty meant independence from 
48 Dallin, p. 48.
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50 Clarence N. Weems ed., Hulbert’s History of Korea. (2 vols., Hillary House Publishers Ltd., 1962), 
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all nations but Russia.53 A friendly government was established in September, 1897. And a 
report to St. Petersburg informed the Tsar’s ministers that the Korean Council of Ministers 
was headed by a person devoted to Russia.54
6.2 Recession
Nevertheless, Russia’s strong position in Korea was based on prestige rather than 
power. There were neither considerable troops nor naval vessels to support the aggressive, 
sometimes arrogant, steps taken by the Russian envoy. His activities aroused protests; 
ministers chose to resign rather than accept certain of his more extreme demands. Basking in 
his overconfidence, Speyer, in March, 1898, asked for the elimination of a number of persons 
in the Korean Government who opposed Russian interests, and threatened that in case of 
refusal, Russia would withdraw her military instructors from Korea. He was astounded 
when the King decided against him. The demands were rejected, and the Russian officers 
were forced to quit. The Russian -Korean Bank, established a short time before, was closed. 
Although Russia did not commit herself to the hands-off policy in Korea in the Nishi - Rosen 
Convention of April 1898, Russia virtually retreated from the Korean Scene. In other words, 
Russian influence in Korea diminished.55
Why did Russian influence in Korea become so weak? First of all, Russia’s withdrawal 
from Korea was a direct consequence of her nonobservance of the principle of cautious 
maneuvering which, at least until the turn of the century, had been found to be obligatory for 
her.56 In other word, there was no evidence for any immediate Russian design to improve her 
lot in Korea. Moreover, Russian control over Korea collapsed like a house of cards. In St. 
Petersburg there was the division between the policymakers regarding Korean problem. The 
scholar, Romanov, for example, considers Korea not to have been regarded as one of Russia’s 
significant national interests and implies that it could have been dispensed with. However, 
the archives in European Russia may be misleading on that point; the situation on the ground 
suggests that it was a vital national objective. 
Secondly, the attention of Russian government was gradually shifting to southern 
Manchuria; the acquisition of ports and areas now occupied the minds and labor of men in 
and around the Tsar’s court.57 Thirdly, Speyer, the aggressive Russian Minister at Seoul, was 
replaced by the more easy-going Matiunin.
 Despite the publicity, much of it inspired by Japan, on Russia’s aggressive intentions 
in Korea, actual events and statistics failed to substantiate such allegations. The series of 
Russian conferences from February to August, 1903 had definitely ruled out aggression in 
regard to Korea. They had even ruled out further government financial participation in the 
yalu enterprise which was the only active Russian concession in Korea.58 Furthermore, 
53 Dallin, p. 49.
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58 The conferences took place on March 26, and May 7 1903. On March 26, 1903, a conference was 
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Russia had the smallest number of citizens residing in Korea, smaller than even Great Britain 
or the United States. The Russian Church hardly had any members or Korean converts.59
In 1903, fearing the growth of Japanese influence in Korea, the Russian Minister in Seoul 
occasionally protested some phases of the expansion of Japanese influence.  He protested 
the appointment of Kato, a Japanese, as adviser to the Department of Agriculture, Trade, 
and Industry- a position that would give Japan strongest influence in the financial councils 
of the country. However, this appointment went through over the Russian protest. Either the 
protests were not strongly presented or Russia was not sufficiently interested in the matter. 
Russia considered Japanese domination of Korea a foregone conclusion. Pavlov, the Russian 
Minister, was not very much interested in Korea, because he believed that Russia should 
expand in the direction of China. There was another possible reason for his disinterest. 
According to the American Minister to Seoul, Pavlov became infatuated and married a teen-
age girl in the winter of 1903-1904 and thereafter did not attend to his duties.60
6.3 Japan as a rival
On the other hand, Japan never ceased to increase her influence in Korea, not only in non-
political fields but also in political matters, despite the temporary recess of political influence 
in 1895 and 1896. Japan’s economic penetration into Korea was significant. There were 
twenty branches of Japanese banks in Seoul and the treaty ports.  The Daiichi Bank of Japan 
had become virtually the central bank of Korea, handling customs duties, purchasing gold 
and silver, controlling government loans, managing the treasury and issuing currency. There 
were 210 Japanese firms operating in Korea by 1896, whereas firms of all other foreign 
countries combined amounted to only forty-eight. In 1903, the Japanese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs was able to announce officially that:
Japan possessed paramount political as well as commercial and industrial interests and 
influences in Korea, which, having regard to her security, she cannot consent to share with 
any power.61 Indeed, no other power had as much as interest in Korea in 1903 as did Japan. 
Japan was the most powerful country in the Great Game in Korea during the early 20th 
century. Forty to fifty percent of the annual budget went to the military, while Japan took 
advantage of the shifting alliances and conflicts among the great powers to obtain loans, 
equipment and expert advice in a wide variety of technical fields.62
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In the Japanese assertion of her paramount interests and influence in Korea, she refused to 
see that Russia had any matching interests in Manchuria. Japan not only wanted to dominate 
Korea all by herself, but also she desired Manchuria for future expansion. Such Japanese 
ambitions were revealed in the second part of Article III of the four Japanese proposals to 
Russia on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan demanded that Russia should not impede 
with the eventual extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect 
with the Eastern Chinese and Shanhaikwan- Newchwang lines. Furthermore, in 1903 Japan 
demanded that Russia conclude another Nishi-Rosen agreement- whereby both powers 
reaffirmed Korea’s independence and pledged noninterference in its internal affairs in 1898- 
with her concerning Manchuria.63
Russia was willing to recognize the existing Japanese rights and interests in Korea but 
was unwilling to admit that Japan had any rights whatsoever in Manchuria.  Russia actually 
demanded that Japan recognize the fact that Russia had the same rights and interests in 
Manchuria as Japan had in Korea. However, Japan did not yield and continued to show her 
interests toward Manchuria. It seems very probable, therefore, that the immediate cause of 
Russo-Japanese War lay in Manchuria as much as it did in Korea.
7. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR IN 1905
7.1 Backdrop and Progress
The Russo-Japanese war was not simply a war between Japan and Russia; it was a 
war fought over the Russian occupation of Chinese territory, using Korea as one of the 
zones of operations. Japan struck Russia without warning, just as she had struck China 
ten years before. On February 8, 1904, Japanese ships opened fire on Port Arthur, bottling 
up the Russian fleet at anchor there. War was officially declared on the tenth.  The Korean 
government immediately declared complete neutrality, but neutrality was totally ignored 
by Japan. Japanese troops landed at Inchon, a Korean harbor near Seoul and immediately 
marched into Seoul.64 In response to the Korean government’s complaint, Komura Jutaro 
Japanese Foreign Minister stated on 26 September 1905 that it was unpropitious and also 
very untimely to discuss warfare and neutrality now.65  Japan simply intended to use Korea 
as a military base in her war with Russia, and to this end would also deprive the nation 
of its sovereignty by taking control of foreign relations. When the war went favorably for 
Japan, she took the further step of abrogating all agreements between Korea and Russia and 
depriving all concessions granted to Russians.
Japan inflicted a series of decisive defeats on Russia. In March of 1905 the important 
Manchurian city of Mukden fell. In a desperate attempt to tip the balance, Russia sent her 
Baltic fleet all the way to Asia. It was denied the use of the Suez Canal by Britain and had to 
sail around Africa to reach its destination. I had hardly arrived when, however, it was blown 
to pieces by the Japanese navy off Tsushima Island in the Korea Strait. After this, Russian 
capitulation was only a matter of time, and Korean independence was doomed. And finally, 
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in July of 1905 Russia admitted defeat and consented to begin peace negotiations.66
7.2 The cause of the War: Korean question
One might argue that the Russo-Japanese war was a preventable war into Russians slid 
unconsciously.67 This is easy to suggest; but it is difficult to imagine an acceptable solution 
to the problems at issue short of near surrender by Russia. Neither sides were willing to give 
up their claims. Russia’s reticence to yield Korea to Japan entirely, indicates how the issues 
surrounding the causes of the war were tense between the two countries.
Over the basic problem of Korea, the Japanese defined their position very clearly. In the 
cabinet resolution of 30 December 1903, it was agreed: It is inevitable that we should keep 
Korea under our thumb by force whatever happens but, as it is desirable for us, if possible, 
to justify our actions, we should try to conclude an offensive-defensive alliance with the 
Koreans or a treaty for their protection as was done during our war with China (1894-1895). 
We have been taking steps to prepare the ground for such treaties and will continue to do so 
in the future. Our Korean policy, in short, depends either directly or indirectly, on conducting 
military operations and must be determined in accordance with military criteria.68
While no mention of Russian activities is made in this resolution, it is clear that Japan 
wanted supremacy in the peninsula and would only achieve it by removing Russian influence 
from the court and the territory as a whole.
On the other hand, it is very difficult to define the Russian position on Korea because 
it was a subject of divided opinions. In St. Petersburg there was the division between the 
policymakers regarding Korean problem. The scholar, Romanov, considers Korea not to have 
been regarded as one of Russia’s significant national interests and implies that it could have 
been dispensed with. However, the archives in European Russia may be misleading on that 
point; the situation on the ground suggests that it was a vital national objective.69
7.3 Why did Japan win the War?
There were few who had believed that this small nation, almost unknown to the world, 
would be able to beat Russia. Japan had displayed a high degree of military preparedness, 
efficiency, and technical skill, and her admirals and generals proved to be not inferior to 
the military leaders of Europe. The Japanese intelligence service was amazingly efficient, 
and Japanese espionage work in Russia during the war was most thorough. Japan spent 120 
million yen (about 10 percent of her budget) for intelligence work in Russia.70
On the other hand, Russia lacked military efficiency. She had no definite strategical plan; 
her generals and officers displayed insufficient interest in the operations. The one-track 
Siberian railroad was constantly jammed, and the chaotic situation impeded the transport of 
troops and supplies from Europe. A series of commercial scandals occurred in connection 
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with war supplies. The quality of military matériel was inferior, due to the deep network of 
bribery surrounding the War Department.71
As far as the Russian population was concerned, the war with Japan was one of the most 
unpopular in Russian history. In the very first weeks of the war, the government attempted 
to organize patriotic demonstrations in the cities. These, however, were no more than 
processions of small groups, guarded by police, with a few government officials carrying 
a large picture of the Tsar at the head. The Tsar himself traveled over the country to greet 
the regiments departing for the Far East; his presence, however, did not evoke any great 
enthusiasm, particularly when the news of the defeats became known.72
On the other hand, Japan’s population of 45 million was mentally prepared for war 
against Russia. The Press and through it the public had a fair idea of the negotiations which 
had been proceeding and were much more bellicose than the government. Indeed, the 
ministry had to restrain the people from its enthusiasm for war by painting a deceptively 
favorable impression of the progress which negotiations were making.73
7.4 The nature of the War
In its origins, the Russo-Japanese War stands in interesting contrast to other modern 
wars. It was not the result of economic pressures, for example the scarcity of resources for 
the number of people. Japan indeed suffered from a shortage of raw materials and a rapidly 
growing population. Both Korea and Manchuria were sought for raw materials and a rapidly 
growing population. Japan was not in a state of social disintegration and was seeking war 
as a way of diverting attention from domestic problems. In 1904, there was no appeal to 
xenophobia or nationalism or war-lust on the part of the Japanese people in order to deflect 
them from thoughts of poverty, revolution or political discontent. In contrast, Russia was in 
a state of social disintegration. But there is no evidence that this prompted the tsar to look to 
war as a way of uniting the nation. A war in far-off Manchuria did not initially have much 
impact on European Russia. While the war became popular in Japan, there is little evidence 
that it ever was in Russia.74
The war broke out mainly because of strategic considerations. The factors which seem 
to have weighed most were security and fear of armament policies on the part of the other 
party.75 Both countries had increased their military and naval strength over a decade. The 
Japanese feared the increase in Russian military and naval build-up in east Asia since 1900, 
especially after the Siberian railway came into operation. It directly threatened their own 
interests there. Russians also concerned Japan’s military growth but the general reaction of 
the Russian military seems to have been to discount her army and navy. And finally Russian 
ignorance led to its defeat in the war.
Another intriguing aspect regarding the Russo-Japanese war lies with the question of 
alliance. Even though the war was not a world war, it had repercussions throughout the 
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world. Though the outside powers were not belligerents, they were surely involved.76 The 
war took place at the height of the secret alliances in world history. Nevertheless, it would be 
wrong to imagine that the Franco-Russian alliance or the Anglo-Japanese alliance caused the 
war. The European allies of the Russo-Japanese conflicts were the main external supporters 
of their allies but did not exercise control over them in either case. There is no doubt that 
Anglo-Japanese alliance indeed narrowed the scope of any war. In other words, Japan 
somewhat benefited from Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan feared most of all the reappearance 
of the Russo-German-French coalition of 1895. However, it was prevented by the British 
alliance and the Anglo-French ententes. Japan could make the decision to go to war with 
a fair prospect of a straightforward two-party conflict. The events of 1895 with which this 
study began hung like a cloud over the events of 1904.77
7.5 Implication for Korea
With regard to Korea, which had been the main bone of contention between Russia and 
Japan on the eve of the war, Japan scored a total victory. The victory over Russia gave Japan 
substantial recognition of taking control of Korea exclusively from other great powers. 
Even before the war had ended, Tokyo had secured Britain’s acknowledgment of Japan’s 
paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea. By the treaty of August 12, 
1905, Britain recognized the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and 
protection of Korea as she may deem proper and necessary.78
Similarly the United States concluded an unpublicized agreement (A recorded 
conversation between Secretary William Taft and Premier Count Katsura) by which Japan 
pledged not to harbor any aggressive designs against the Philippines, while the United States 
agreed to Japanese suzerainty over Korea. Later President Theodore Roosevelt assured Tokyo 
that the reorganization of Korea by the Japanese would meet no opposition from the United 
States.79
At the peace treaty of Portsmouth, Russia was compelled to recognize the paramount 
political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea; Russia agreed Anot to interfere 
or place obstacles in the way of any measure of direction or protection and supervision that 
the Imperial Government of Japan may deem necessary to adopt in Korea.80
Most importantly, it was agreed that the sovereignty of Korea should not be mentioned 
in any international treaty, effectively leading to public acknowledgment of Japanese control 
over Korean foreign relations. Consequently, Japan now had guarantees from three of the 
world’s great powers to do as she liked with Korea. The Korean people, against their will 
and without being consulted, came under the rule of Japan at least partly by a conspiracy of 
Western nations. It was a proceeding that did honor to none of the parties to it.      
As a result of the war, Russian power was reduced and Japan emerged as the strongest 
power of the Far East. Japan owed her successes in large part to the support of Britain and 
America. yet her ambitions went far beyond her wartime accomplishments. 
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8. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN KOREA FOLLOWING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
After the War, Russia almost lost all of its privileges in Korea. The new Russian Consul 
General after the war, Plancon, arrived with credentials to the Korean government, but the 
Japanese forced the Russians to draft him new credentials to the Japanese government before 
allowing him to assume his position.81 Furthermore, the decline in the number of Russian 
residents in Korea explicitly demonstrated the collapse of Russian influence in Korea. After 
the war there remained only the necessary consular personnel and missionaries.82
In addition, various Russo-Korean treaties and agreements were canceled, including the 
lease. The Russian Government, through their Consul General at Seoul asked the Japanese 
Resident General to have returned 50,000 yen which had been paid for that concession, 
inclusive of adjacent lands bought by Russian private citizens.  Since the site of these 
buildings was regarded as important for Korean and Japanese defences, the Resident General, 
after consulting with the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Navy and Army, entered 
into negotiations on the subject. On April 19, 1909, the Russian government was reimbursed 
and thereupon relinquished all claims connected with the Masanpo land. After consultation 
with the Korean government, the land was turned over to the Accounts Department of the 
Japanese Garrison Army in Korea.83
9. CONCLUSION
9.1 Assessment of Russia’s performance during the Great Game in Korea
Like the other great powers, Russia acquired territory, and controlled where it could, but 
in East Asia it was less the initiator of events than their exploiter. Russia was drawn into 
situations as much as it actively pushed its way into them, and generally was more occupied 
with defensive than with offensive measures. The colonization of the eastern regions proved 
more difficult and less profitable than anticipated. In particular, Russia had reduced her pace 
to a jog on the Korean track.84 Russia did not want to lead for fear of initiating changes with 
which it was not prepared to cope.85
Russian foreign policy in the Far East was hamstrung by the inability of the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Navy, and War to agree on common objectives in the Far East. 
While the Foreign Ministry aimed above all at avoiding an armed conflict with Great Britain 
or Japan, the Finance Ministry aspired to preserve an entente with China in order to develop 
Russo-Chinese commerce. The Navy Ministry’s priority was a naval base, while the General 
Staff was more concerned with the development and security of the Russian possessions 
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along the Amur River.86
9.2 Why did Russia fail in Korea? 
Russian policy in Korea eventually failed miserably. Despite the time and energy devoted 
to the problem of Korea by Russian statesmen Russia failed to gain more than temporary 
advantage in Korea. Why?
First, Russian policy toward Korea was not consistent throughout the whole Game. The 
methods and speed with which they attempted to achieve their ends varied with the faction in 
power. For instance, in 1895 Russia was fortunate enough to have in Seoul a representative 
who understood the best way to influence Korea, through intrigue and individuals. 
Simultaneously, Russian statesmen seemed to be following a wait- and -see policy, with no 
strong demands. It was at this time that Russia made its greatest gains in Korea. On the other 
hand, the Russian Minister of Finances, Witte’s policy toward Korea was rather hesitant. This 
was the beginning of Russia’s downfall in Korea.  Furthermore, the endless debate between a 
retired captain of Chevalier Guards, Bezobrazov’s expansionist faction that wished to build a 
Far Eastern Empire based on Korea and his opponents who preferred a more cautious course, 
clearly indicates again how Russia’s policy toward Korea was inconsistent.
Second, the imperialistic moves of the Russians, their demands, and their neglect of 
promised aid lost them the support of Koreans of all classes, except for a few corrupt 
politicians. The good will which they gained by aiding King Kojong in 1896 was evaporated 
needlessly. They had no strong and sympathetic group of Koreans to aid Russian projects 
such as the Soviets created half a century later.
Third, although as a geographic entity Russia was one of Korea’s closest neighbors, 
Russia as a state was located too far away from Korea. While telegraphic communications 
between Korea and Moscow were reasonably efficient, they were at the mercy of the Chinese, 
Japanese, and Koreans. Transportation of personnel and military equipment was slow and 
inconsistent. The territory between Korea and European Russia was sparsely settled. There 
was no efficient way for Russia to build up sufficient military strength in the Far East to 
assure control of Korea.
Fourth, the matter of the long distance between the two countries also led to the lack 
of commercial enterprise in Korea. Russia could not take advantage of commercial basis, 
unlike other powers used it as basis for their political pretensions. For example, the lumber 
concession, besides being primarily political, was essential neither to the Koreans nor to the 
Russians. Trade between the two countries was almost negligible.
While Russia was struggling under difficulties both natural and self-created, Japan had 
none of these problems. Japan was the most successful contender in the Great Game in 
Korea. Its new Army had continued to defeat its major rivals: China in 1895 and Russia in 
1904. Its power lay but a short distance from Korea. It controlled most of the Korean trade, 
and had numerous settlements in Korea.
Imperial Russia was in decline; the symptoms were evident in Korea as elsewhere. In my 
opinion, her failures in Korea and the Far East helped to hasten her collapse. If the Tsar had 
been strong enough to take a firm position on what Russia really did want from Korea, and 
keep his subordinates in line, rather than swaying with the most persuasive, catastrophe might 
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have been avoided. However such was not the case. Throughout the Great Game in Korea, 
the Russian bear was used as a bugbear by the various powers to intimidate and contain their 
rivals or to justify their own moves in the international balance of intrigue.
9.3 Final Lesson for Today
The Great Game which took place in the late 19th century and early 20th century tosses a 
number of caveats for today’s international relations in East Asia. Clearly almost one century 
later, the new Great Game is taking place over the Korean Peninsula. The main casts in this 
game were clearly replaced by different members of surrounding states. Nonetheless, the 
situation is more serious and more complicated over the divided Korean Peninsula. The lack 
of leadership and the unconfident desire for pursuing ambiguously independent diplomacy 
by top leadership from the South Korean perspective, and unsettled nuclear proliferation 
threat by the North Korean side, the tense US- China balance of power relations, all make 
the geopolitics in the Korean Peninsula even worse than almost once century ago. In other 
words, King Kojong’s initial attempts and strategy of being neutral between Japan and 
Russia somehow resemble South Korea’s ambivalent stance between China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative and the US led Indo- Pacific Strategy. The outcome of Kojong’s policy turned out 
quite miserable because it finally ended up with Korea’s loosing national sovereignty to Japan 
for the first time ever in Korea’s history. The timing was too late for the late 19th century 
Korea to turn its clock back to prior to Japan’s annexation. This is also similar to Chinese 
Qing dynasty’s invasion to Chosun in 1636. During the 17th century, the leadership of Chosun 
Dynasty was clearly lacking in strategic thinking amid balancing relations between Ming 
Dynasty and Qing Dynasty. It is important to understand that historically Korea’s failure 
of balancing two great powers created national disaster. It is crucially important for the 
leadership of Korea to remember theory and diplomatic realities are completely two different 
caveats of international relations.     
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